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Associations and Democracy in Algeria   
What role does associational activism play in political life in the Middle East and 
North Africa? Have associations been largely co-opted, thus reinforcing 
authoritarian governance? Or are they part of drawn out democratization 
processes, emerging over the last two decades, exploding during the Arab 
Spring? Divergences in responses to these questions have been striking. From 
initial optimism about the potential of associations to contribute to 
democratization, much recent literature has been increasingly pessimistic, 
framing associations as part of the problem of failed political transformations.  
Algeria, in particular, despite minimal donor funding, has seen a surge in 
associations over the last twenty years. Yet these 93,000 new associations have 
come under scrutiny. Building on extensive field-work, this article explores 
Algerian associations at grass-roots level, after the decade of violence in the 
1990s. It analyses how associations challenged the state during the Arab Spring, 
how they question historical state narratives and challenge government policies. 
Despite political and structural obstacles, it is found that Algerian civic 
associations do not inhibit democratic society, indeed they enable it, not 
necessarily as transformative actors, but as meaningful democratic agents 
pushing for reform. 
Keywords: civil society; associations; democratization; Algeria; civic 
engagement  
 
Introduction  
For centuries we have debated the role of associational life in politics, in the quality of 
democracy and in democratization processes.1 In the last two decades there has been an 
increasing focus on associations in political life in the Middle East and North Africa, 
particularly since the Arab revolutions of 2011.2  Despite minimal donor funding, and a 
decade of violent conflict, Algeria in particular has seen a surge in the numbers of 
registered associations, with 93,000 associations now officially recorded by the 
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Ministry of Interior.3 At the time of the Arab uprisings of 2011, the Algerian 
government had registered more than double the associations than its nearest 
competitor, Morocco, for which figures were estimated to be around 35,000.4 Figures 
from Ministries, NGO monitoring programmes and academic research also show 
significant increases in the numbers of registered associations across the Middle East 
and North African region as a whole.5  
Yet what does this associative phenomenon mean for political life in North 
Africa? In Algeria, and to a lesser extent across the Arab world, it initially led to great 
optimism in the academic literature. In the early 1990s, many scholars felt that 
associations were part of a growing civil society and as such could contribute to 
democratization.6 This perception continued, even with the turmoil of the violent 
conflict throughout the 1990s which was consuming the Algerian state.   
By the turn of the century however, with the absence of any significant political 
transformation in Algeria and across the region, the role of these new associative actors 
became highly contested. Scholars increasingly questioned the assumption that civil 
society actors in the Arab world were capable of contributing to democratization, as 
hypothesized in the 1990s.7 For some, it was worse: the growth of associations even 
supported the conservation of an authoritarian order.8 For others, associations were 
categorized as too weak9 or too divided10 to enact any real change. More recently, 
Cavatorta and Durac have argued that in the absence of political parties, associations do 
form a framework in which politics happens. The authors challenge the categorization 
of Arab civil society as simply a tool of the state.11 They argue that while it might not be 
merely a tool of the state, nevertheless civil society cannot contribute to 
democratization, as it has to operate within the corrupt patronage networks of the 
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regimes in place.  
In 2011, the role of Algerian associations in the uprisings at the time of the Arab 
revolutions was fairly limited. They were criticized within Algeria by state institutions 
and parliamentarians, as not having prevented trouble.12 External actors, on the 
contrary, complained that they were not real actors capable of providing a coherent 
platform of opposition.13 In 2014, Butcher challenges both these critiques, describing 
how the protests of 2011, in the context of the Arab Spring, did in fact provide an 
opportunity for associations, with the creation, by opposition actors, of the National 
Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD). With this platform, civil society 
groups and political parties, from both Islamist and secular backgrounds, came together 
to peacefully challenge the government and demand political reform.14 She writes that 
the earlier “protests of the 1980s pushed the government to recognize mass civic 
associations (that is, civil society) that have eventually evolved into an associative 
sphere that increasingly challenges the government.” She suggests that the opening up 
of opportunity for associations in 1990, whilst it was not meant to lead to any 
meaningful liberalization, had in reality lead to an explosion in the numbers of actors, 
which could now “lead to more large scale democratic reforms.”15   
Building on Butcher’s recent analysis of Algerian civil society, this article 
explores the role of associations at the micro level, based on an investigation into the 
work of over 200 Algerian associations between 2007 and 2013. Analysing their role in 
challenging government policy in the public sphere and in campaigning on questions of 
governance, it is argued that despite political and structural obstacles, Algerian civic 
associations do not inhibit democratic society, indeed they enable it in many complex, 
but evident ways.  To demonstrate this, the article will firstly explore different 
theoretical arguments concerning the role of associations in democratization and 
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political change. It will explore the Algerian legal and political context for associations 
and the impact of conflict.  It will then assess how associations reacted during the Arab 
uprisings in 2011. Finally, the article will analyse the role of Algerian associations in 
historical narratives, governance, trauma and reconciliation, using specific case studies, 
to explore alternative political roles associations play.  
 
Civil society and associations in democratization    
So what is civil society and how could it contribute to democratization processes? 
Ibrahim defines civil society as “the totality of self-initiating and self-regulating 
volitional social formations, peacefully pursuing a common interest, advocating a 
common cause, or expressing a common passion.”16 Registered associations would thus 
be one part of this civil society, alongside the press, trade unions, teachers, academia, 
intellectuals, artists and informal associations.  Butcher points out that as civil society 
organizations seek state concessions, benefits, policy reform and accountability, for 
public not private ends, “political parties are not generally part of this definition of civil 
society.”17 The link between associations and political parties is nevertheless an 
important dimension, particularly in Algeria where new, mainly Islamist political 
parties have developed since the early 1990s. Democratization theorists have argued 
that associational life can be a way of promoting democratic socialization and 
increasing freedom in the political sphere, through local empowerment and popular 
participation in functioning organizations.18 Scholars have long debated whether there is 
a “functional role played by the associative sphere,” as a precondition of democracy.19 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s findings about associations in America in the nineteenth 
century highlighted them as “schools for civic virtue” and a fundamental part of 
American democracy.20  Proponents of Tocqueville’s thinking argue that through 
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associative engagement, citizens gain skills in political representation, public speaking, 
democratic governance.21 Cavatorta and Durac explain how civil society has been seen 
as good for democracy as “it promotes the interaction of people in a voluntary setting, 
where differences of opinion have to be taken into account.” 22 In the same vein, they 
quote Putnam who argues that associational life also contributes to building social 
capital, as “civil society activism enhances the internal capacity of communities to 
generate social wellbeing.”23 
 But what of civic associations in authoritarian contexts? What happens when 
associations function in legal systems and political environments which are not 
conducive to their development and free functioning? For some scholars, civil society in 
closed political systems is often more likely to ensure the durability of authoritarian 
regimes, rather than lead to a more open society.24 Jamal argues that associations in 
authoritarian contexts are fundamentally different, and that the relationship between 
civic associations and democracy “is a circular and self-reinforcing relationship.”25 
There needs to be pre-existing political institutions, otherwise, she suggests, “ineffective 
democratic institutions promote levels of civic engagement, including social capital, 
supportive of non-democratic procedures.”26 Associations supporting non-democratic 
regimes “enjoy rights and privileges not guaranteed to associations in opposition.”27 
Cavatorta and Durac argue that though a vibrant civil society can exist, authoritarian 
contexts create divisions amongst civil society actors which prevent them from 
challenging incumbent regimes.28 Ciftci and Bernick point out that it is the type of 
behaviour or reasons for civic engagement, such as clientelism, which might, or might 
not, reinforce authoritarianism.29  
 Other scholars, however, point to the capacity of civil society organizations to 
promote non-violent transitions. Referring to the role of Solidarnosc in Poland, and 
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theatres in Czechoslovakia, cultural institutions which facilitated peaceful transitions, it 
is argued that civil society actors can frame societal change as desirable and possible. 
Glenn writes that in Eastern Europe civil society was able to “engage in active 
construction of the messages,” and became “a framing strategy to mobilise support” for 
political change .30  
Abu Sada and Challand write of the ‘repolitization’ of associations in many 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, following the Arab Spring. As the state 
has been losing its monopoly over public action in recent years, they write that new 
forms of contestation are occurring. In Palestine, the context Jamal explores in most 
detail, they argue that a new form of repolitization is now emerging through 
associational life. It was essentially excessive donor interventions in the 1990s, they 
suggest, which had depoliticized many associative actors there.31 This contrasts 
particularly with Algeria, where there have been very low levels of external donor 
funding, since the cancelling of elections in 1991 and the violence which ensued.  
 Schmitter suggests certain criteria which can be used to evaluate associations, as 
to whether they constitute civil society and are positive for democratic consolidation. 
He argues that there are four norms which make associations constitutive of civil 
society. (1) Organizations must be dually autonomous, from the state and private sector; 
(2) they must be capable of deliberating about collective action; (3) organizations must 
not seek to replace the state or private sector and finally, (4) they must agree to act in 
accordance with pre-agreed civil rules. Schmitter points out that, even if constituted, 
civil society itself is not a prerequisite for ending autocracy or for facilitating transitions 
to democracy. He writes that “rarely have actors in civil society alone brought about 
such a change in regime.” 32  
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Schmitter continues to explain how civil society consolidates democracy when 
(1) it stabilizes expectations in social groups and presents authorities with reliable 
information with which to govern; (2) it is civic and respectful of the democratic 
process (3) it provides channels for self-expression; (4) it governs the behaviour of its 
members for collective commitments; and (5) it provides reservoirs of potential 
resistance to arbitrary rule. In contrast, civil society can be negative for democracy, 
according to Schmitter, if it makes majority formation difficult, brings bias to political 
life, or is ethnically, linguistically or culturally divisive.33  Schmitter refers mainly to 
established democracies or to transition processes. However these factors are still useful 
to explore for associations in themselves, in all political regimes, given that, as 
Schmitter suggests, civil society is a facilitating factor, rather than a direct causal factor 
for any democratic transition process.  
The legal and political contexts vary greatly across the Arab world, as in the 
western sphere. Specific trajectories, legal systems, the nature of organizations, as well 
as the role of external donors, need to be explored. Algeria has undergone significant 
transformations, with legal reforms and significant growth of the associative sphere.  As 
well as exploring these trajectories, it is useful to examine specific organizations in 
Algeria. How do these organizations perform in terms of Schmitter’s criteria for 
associations as an effective civil society? Are they civic? Do they combine collective 
commitments and provide resistance to potential tyranny? Do they enable citizens to 
gain experience of political representation and democratic governance? Do they 
contribute to democratic practices, to policy analysis and opposition politics, even if 
they currently operate in a closed political system? Before exploring these questions, the 
following section will explore the backdrop for associations in Algeria. It will look at 
9 
 
the legal and political setting, as well as barriers to democratization, such as the impact 
of violence on associative engagement.  
 
Civil Society in Algeria – Law, Politics and Conflict 
The concept of civil society needs to be rooted in the historical experiences 
which shape the individual society to which it is applied. In Algeria, there is a long 
tradition of religious and local, community-based collective decision making and 
associational activism. During the colonial period, the French 1901 Law governed 
associations, some of which went on to form the underlying structures and actors of the 
independence struggle, and subsequently the Algerian state itself.  Under the stress of 
rolling back the colonial state after 1962, however, nation building did not always 
permit the existence of autonomous organizations.34 Ben Nefissa writes of how “the 
construction of modern states after independence was a period of rupture for associative 
life in Arab countries.”35 In the Algerian case, Addi argues, the need to unify the nation 
after the war of independence, meant there was a “refusal to accept politics and 
conflict,” and a denial of plurality.36 As such, the 1970s and 1980s were dominated by 
state controlled organizations with little freedom of association. Derras writes of how 
the state set up organizations to create unconditional support structures, as a means to 
frame, control and manage society.37 This unsuccessful policy, along with declining 
socio-economic conditions, lead to the riots in 1988. The riots resulted in an overhaul of 
the political system in the following two years, and in 1990 Algeria had a new 
constitution and reformed laws regarding associations and political parties.   
However, this ambitious democratization project of the late 1980s also led to the 
civil conflict, with its tragic consequences. With the election of the Islamist party, the 
FIS, in the first free elections in 1991, the FLN – after dominating post-colonial politics 
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- suffered a massive defeat. This was at the hands of an Islamic opposition, who, having 
captured popular discontent, fought and won, proposing a theocratic state. As Driessen 
points out, the Islamist movement never ‘really articulated the precise institutional 
arrangements they intended to construct’ in Algeria. The party’s ‘lack of political 
precision extended to their characterization of democracy,’ which, they argued, lead to 
‘political idolatry’ and corruption.38 Following this defeat of the FLN at the polls, a 
military coup was orchestrated, halting the electoral process, removing President Chadli 
and preventing the Islamist party from taking power.  The succeeding bloody conflict 
between Islamist insurgents and the military regime resulted in the deaths of an 
estimated 200,000 Algerians. The coup, the conflict, and the resulting state of 
emergency, all contributed to a reversing of the democratization process that had been 
launched in 1989. Algeria returned to a seemingly unavoidable state of authoritarian 
control.  
Yet despite the retracted democratization process, the reforms of the late 1980s, 
as well the conflict itself, did inspire an increasingly dynamic associative movement.39 
In the 1990s, Algerian associations were described as an “impressive array of rights 
oriented groups,”40 and others claimed that “the indisputable existence of an 
increasingly resolute civil society provides the potential for genuine democratization.”41 
Zoubir further describes in 1999 how “the most vocal forces today are the domestic 
forces (political parties and autonomous associations) that can no longer tolerate the 
patterns of authoritarianism that dominated Algeria’s political life for decades.”42 Ben 
Nefissa also recognised that, with the 1990 law, the system of a simple declaration for 
registration was unique within the region. With this, she writes, associations became 
“one of the main modes of expression for Algerian society.”43  
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The space for political parties also opened up. At the beginning of the initial 
democratization project, there were few parties to participate in a liberalized political 
sphere in 1990. The main organizations which did emerge were quickly seen as too 
radical.44 Driessen describes the subsequent evolution of some of the more moderate 
Islamist political parties, which often drew support from successful religious 
associations. He writes of them that “what had begun as an ideological-religious 
movement had transformed itself into a political party whose aim was to win votes and 
govern in a democratic arena.”45 Driessen’s detailed investigations highlight a 
democratic transition within the two main religious political parties in Algeria (the MSP 
and Islah), following the banning of the FIS party. However, he also shows the lack of 
political support sustained by either party. Despite the increasing religiosity in the 
population, Islamist political parties were not seen as a credible force in political life.46 
Nor had they proved their capacity to take on the main challenges facing Algerian 
society (housing, terrorism, diversification of the economy). Within the opposition, they 
developed a strong platform calling for political change,47 but as political actors, even if 
they openly embraced democracy, they were not seen as able to contribute to real 
democratization.  
One of the main challenges for Algerian associations (and political parties), 
from both secular and religious backgrounds, is still the post conflict environment in 
which they operate. During the political violence of the 1990s, hundreds of thousands 
lost their lives, but many more fled the country. The assassination of intellectuals, 
professors, doctors, journalists, activists, feminists, school teachers and entire villages 
created an environment in which simply holding a meeting was a political act of great 
courage. Lloyd describes the violent context in which many associations first 
developed. She writes how women’s associations, and individual women, were forced 
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to the forefront of fighting terrorism, as its victims, or through losing family members. 
All associations had to function through “subtle networking with scarce resources,” 
organising meetings “on an impromptu basis to take advantage of the presence of 
visitors.” 48  Resistance, she writes, was “implicit in the maintenance of everyday life.” 
Associations providing help for the traumatised, or support for children’s education, 
contained “broader ramifications,” Lloyd writes, 49 of a brave political protest, given the 
direct threat made by insurgents against victims, their families, teachers and schools.  
Algeria has not recovered from this conflict. Associations are still deeply 
affected by the assassination or exile of their members. The insistence of associative 
actors in trying to deal with Algerians’ trauma,50 despite the refusal of the state to fully 
engage in the process,51 makes their work politically sensitive. There are also divisions 
in Algerian civil society, between actors from different sides of the conflict. Cavatorta 
and Elananza point to “the problematic relationship between the secular and Islamist 
opposition,”52 but also acknowledge cases of co-operation.53 They cite the example of 
Islamist and secular associations both challenging the state’s policy of reconciliation. 
All associations agree that preventing families from accessing the truth about those who 
disappeared during the 1990s, does not provide justice. In 2011, the secular and Islamist 
opposition came together again, under the umbrella of the CNCD platform, to challenge 
the government. It remains within the associative sector that difficult claims about 
reconciliation and Algeria’s political future are formulated.  
Reform of Algerian political life would seem to require new actors and viable 
alternatives, given the failure of Islamist parties to gain the trust of a significant part of 
the population (similar to the Berber parties). The fear of a return to violence also 
means that radical “regime change,” is unlikely to gain any support from the population. 
Given the strong desire for democratic governance in Algeria,54 it is thus useful to 
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explore further the increasing number of Algerian associations. In providing 
opportunities for interest representation, policy dialogue and democratic governance 
(factors identified by the civil society and democratization theorists as potential 
catalysts for change) associations, it is argued, can become meaningful democratic 
agents. Although operating in a closed political environment, with the barriers to 
political participation Jamal highlights, Algerian associations do not promote non-
democratic practices, and rarely simply follow instructions from state institutions. 
Rather they enter processes of negotiation, not only to contribute to the different sector 
they engage in, but also to challenge the state. The following sections will explore 
examples of such processes in Algeria, looking at how associations do now engage in 
politics, overcome divisions and increase the capacity of communities to generate social 
wellbeing.  The next section will focus firstly on the context of the “Arab Spring” in 
2011. 
Associations in Algeria and the “Arab Spring”   
Between December 2010 and March 2011, Algeria experienced significant unrest, with 
demonstrations and self-immolations, in protest against chronic unemployment, lack of 
housing, increasing food prices, inflation and corruption. These protests happened in 
parallel with the similar movements in Tunisia and in Egypt.  They were neither 
Islamist, nor organised along ethnic lines, even if they expressed frustration at the same 
issues as those of the Islamist and Berber demonstrations a decade earlier.55 In this 
context, two events took place in which associations were of key importance. Firstly, a 
platform was created in early 2011 – the CNCD – which could be seen as presenting a 
potential challenge to the government. Secondly, a number of networks were 
established to challenge the new Law on Associations, promulgated that same year.56  
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The National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) 
In the tense context of January 2011, a number of associations, as well as some political 
parties, met to create the “National Coordination for Change and Democracy” (CNCD). 
This movement was a platform for systemic political change, to mobilize and to 
organize marches to get their message across. The movement was made of up of active 
associations, including human rights organizations, such as the Algerian League of 
Human Rights (LADDH),  as well as cultural organizations, student bodies, local 
associations, trade unions, political parties including the Islamist MSP, individual 
activists and intellectuals. Its members sought the reversal of the State of Emergency, 
which had been in place since 1992. They also argued for complete reform of the 
Algerian political system and for the removal, by the army, of the president.57 
The marches were repressed by a significant police presence, but were in fact 
not heavily attended and were relatively quickly dispersed by the security services. 
Some significant members of the CNCD, such as the leader of the Kabyle socialist 
party, resigned over the following months. They indicated their continued support for 
democratic change in Algeria, but questioned the utility of demonstrations in the current 
context. They referred to scissions in the CNCD, between apolitical civil society actors 
and the more partisan political parties.58  
While the demonstrations were quickly repressed, the movement itself was also 
fragmented. The CNCD did not appear to have a united plan, or loyal following. It 
proved a fairly weak coalition.  It did not appear to have the support of ordinary 
Algerians, who desired change, but not at the potential cost of more human life. 
Instability in the region as a whole further reinforced Algerian fears, and strengthened, 
despite all the problems, the sense of a need for national solidarity.  
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However, the CNCD was unique in that it brought together activists from all 
sides of the Algerian political spectrum. It included Islamist parties, which had 
previously been ambiguous towards calls for democratization, alongside human rights 
and secular activists, calling for meaningful political reform and democracy. In response 
to the civil unrest and creation of the CNCD, the regime did attempt limited reforms. In 
February 2011, President Bouteflika lifted the 19 year State of Emergency laws which 
had been one of the key demands of the CNCD, and a main source of frustration for all 
those demanding the right to protest. Further reforms and subsidies reduced frustrations, 
but did little to tackle the deeper underlying causes of discontent. In the slightly calmer 
political environment that developed in the spring of 2011, the state began a process of 
political dialogue.  
A wide national consultation process was launched in April 2011 to discuss 
reform, piloted by the Conseil National Economique et Sociale (CNES). It was 
described by an EU official in Algiers as, “by far one of the more progressive responses 
to the wave of discontent in the region.”59 At local level too, consultation processes 
were carried out across the country but were received with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm. Some associations considered them to be “pointless,” that their opinions 
were unlikely to be considered. A member of one association qualified the state, in this 
consultation process, as “unable to communicate and therefore dialoguing only with 
itself.”60 The lack of trust in the consultation process further exacerbated the problems 
of disconnection between state and people. The state’s immediate reaction, therefore, 
did not succeed in improving its strained relationship with civil society. As well as the 
consultation process, the state also promised, however, constitutional and legal reforms, 
together with new dialogue, with implications for the nature of governance in Algeria. 
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The Associative Lobby and the new Law on Associations 201261  
In September 2011, the Algerian state drew up a new Law on Associations. It also 
launched a consultation process. Many associations received the draft text and discussed 
it in informal networks.62 The preamble of the new law outlined the wish to facilitate, to 
simplify and to reduce the administrative burden on associations.63 It proposed to give 
powers to local town halls to register associations, and to reduce the number of 
founding members required.  However, the new law also significantly increased the 
potential controls by the executive. Many associations felt that the state could maintain 
a legitimized form of repression, through this new legal framework, which would 
require them all to resubmit their statutes.   
Campaigns emerged across the country, led by associations and their networks,64 
targeting the media and MPs. The law was finally debated in Parliament in November 
2011. The deputies criticized and rejected the law, arguing it was unconstitutional and 
went against the spirit of partnership with civil society.65 It appeared that parliament had 
responded to the lobbying efforts of the associations.  Yet, on the 14 December 2011, 
the law was sent back to parliament, passed as it stood, and subsequently adopted by the 
Council of the Nation. It was published in the Official Journal, on the 12 January 2012.  
Whilst this was a disappointment to the associations, they had nevertheless succeeded in 
initiating a campaign that led to the questioning of a law in Parliament. The campaign 
had also led many associations to realise the importance of cooperating within 
networks, of challenging the state, and of strengthening Algeria’s democratic 
institutions, which had proved to be so weak.66  
Algerian Associations and everyday politics 
In his work on civil society and the consolidation of democracy, Schmitter suggests that 
associations which steer their members towards collective commitments and democratic 
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governance, and provide pools of resistance to arbitrary government, can play a 
significant role in political life.67 In closed political contexts, associations, particularly 
cultural ones, can also frame political messages, and the desirability of change, as Glenn 
shows, in the case of the transitions in Eastern Europe.68 What associations do, their 
very nature, their relations with the state, and their internal functioning, thus matter, 
when assessing their role in promoting political reform.  
The following cases represent typical associations from the two most significant 
sectors targeted by associational life: heritage protection and the social sector. Several 
studies have analyzed the sectoral distribution of the associations across Algeria.69 In 
2007, Omar Derras carried out extensive, nation-wide research into the associative 
phenomenon, selecting ‘active’ associations along a set of criteria.  In his study of 
‘active’ associations, Derras notes 43% in the social sector, followed by 28% in the 
cultural sector.70 The 2012 Ministry of Interior data indicates that nationally, 
associations in the cultural and heritage sector represent 16%, and health associations 
15% of registered associations - the largest two groups after professional trade unions.71 
The following case studies will therefore focus on associations in the heritage and social 
sectors. They will explore how these organizations perform, in view of the 
democratization theorists’ criteria for associations as effective actors in civil society, 
capable of promoting democratic governance.  
Heritage Associations – the case of Bel Horizon  
Since the 1990s, the Algerian state has attributed a role to cultural associations in the 
protection of cultural heritage, through legal reforms and in response to demands by 
associations. The Algerian Law for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Loi-98-04) 
identifies as national heritage all tangible and intangible artifacts, buildings, monuments 
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and traditions, upon and in Algerian soil, from pre-history to the current day. Article 4 
of this law allows that such goods be managed by associations, under the prescriptions 
of the Law on Associations.  
Within this framework, in 2001, the association “Bel Horizon” was created in 
Oran in the context of the celebrations commemorating 1100 years since the foundation 
of the city, one of the oldest in North Africa, by Andalousian merchants. The 
association was created by a group of activists, passionate about history, who wanted to 
restore the heritage of their city. From modest origins, the association now has fifty 
longstanding volunteers, twenty associate members  and no paid, permanent staff 
making it one of the more successful and sustainable Algerian associations. The 
association has published books and renovated many of the historical sites. It has 
trained over 3,500 young people in the protection of natural sites, photography, film 
production, heritage and environmental governance. Initially functioning with limited 
funds, the association has more recently been successful in gaining small grants for 
specific projects.  
A first objective of the association was to restore the sixteenth century Spanish 
Santa Cruz Fort in Oran. This project was significant, firstly, as renovating a Spanish 
vestige clearly diverged from the state’s priorities in terms of restoring historical 
monuments. Across Algeria, in line with the nation building project, authorities had 
sought to promote first and foremost Algeria’s Arab-Muslim heritage.72 Bel Horizon’s 
initial projects therefore conflicted with the state’s vision for what parts of history 
should be “remembered.” Secondly, the restoration involved the securitizing of a whole 
area of the city, the mountain up to the Fort, which had been off bounds during the 
1990s, when insurgent groups inhabited this area.  The returning of this space to the 
population was a highly symbolic moment, marking the end of violence. Through 
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negotiations with local people and the authorities, touching on colonial history and the 
recent conflict of the 1990s, Bel Horizon managed to both challenge and to cooperate 
with the state through its work in Santa Cruz. 
From this Bel Horizon went on to organize regular cultural activities, music 
festivals, and an annual “Heritage Walk.” This walk takes the population, in its 
thousands, through the different historical areas of the city, to the Spanish Fort, 
publically reclaiming this space for Oran’s citizens. In 2011 this attracted over 20,000 
people who marched from the central square up to the fort. This is an indication of the 
interest of the population in their cultural heritage, but also of the capacity of the 
association to understand and represent citizens.  All the events are filmed and made 
available to the public on social media and the association’s website.73  
In pursuing their activities, relations with the authorities have not been 
straightforward. Defining heritage has national implications; it also questions local 
urbanization policies, as well as the authorities’ capacity to manage development and 
protect historical buildings. A number of conflicts have emerged, particularly 
concerning the status of colonial and Jewish buildings, and how best to preserve Oran’s 
heritage. Through dialogue with local political actors, the association has been able to 
influence decisions about urban policies and protect contested buildings.  
In interviews, the president of the association, Kouider Metair, confirmed the 
priority of promoting the heritage of Algeria and criticized the lack of interest of the 
authorities in doing the same.74 The president explained the ideological reasons for this 
state denial of local cultural narratives, across Algeria and particularly in Oran. The city 
has a distinct multicultural identity and its narrative of history has suffered, due to the 
unified, homogenous identity, which the Algerian state sought to impose since 
independence. This is a claim they make openly, and it is one echoed by many cultural 
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associations across Algeria. Such associations challenge, but also try to understand, the 
state’s denial of certain narratives of history and seek to overcome these blockages 
through actively preserving the past.75  
Members of Bel Horizon and the Santé Sidi el Houari, another active cultural 
association in Oran, have also seen their leaders go on to be elected members of local 
government, at the Communal Council (APC) level. Through this transition, associative 
actors have been able to gain experience of local politics, as well as access to 
information and a better understanding of local government. Other associations 
interviewed across Algeria have also seen their leaders, previously inactive in political 
life, stand for election at local level.76 The transition from civic to political activism, 
either in campaigns such as the CNCD or in the elected bodies is not unique to Bel 
Horizon.  
Formal and informal networks exist, regrouping associations, such as those in 
the heritage sector across the country. Bel Horizon is a lead actor in these networks, 
encouraging other heritage associations to take ownership of historical narratives 
defining Algeria as a nation. The organization and its members clearly challenge state 
narratives, go on to roles in local government, and encourage young people to engage in 
a more constructive political debate. Electing leaders through the annual general 
assembly, the organization also enables its members to participate in democratic 
governance processes, and to work for public rather than private interests.  Promoting 
more inclusive, open identities, Bel Horizon, alongside many other Algerian heritage 
associations, seeks recognition of the diversity of the country, through a constructive 
and inherently political goal of redefining the past. As such, in its objectives and its 
functioning, through its daily activities, the association promotes democratic 
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governance and education, for its members and the wider beneficiaries with whom they 
work.  
Social Sector Associations – the case of the Boucebci Foundation  
The Law on Associations allows social organizations to receive public grants and to 
acquire goods and property in order to implement their goals. Associations working on 
social issues, in contrast to heritage associations, are often created to deal with personal 
grievances, affecting a family or a community, for which the existing solutions are 
either inadequate or inexistent.  They often exist to fill the gaps that the state’s services 
are unable to fill, in caring for vulnerable sections of the population. The potential for 
conflict with the state, which sees its role from an all-encompassing perspective, is high. 
Many social associations were born out of the conflict of the 1990s. The intense 
suffering of the population, the loss of state legitimacy and the common experience of 
injustice were behind many of the decisions to create associations. National 
organizations were created, both Islamic and secular, with the aim of caring for and 
seeking justice for families of the disappeared.77 Foundations were created to 
commemorate the politicians, intellectuals and activists who were assassinated.  
Charitable associations were set up for the psychological care of orphans, and families 
of the victims. Such associations are important in their very existence, in that they 
commemorate and shape the narrative history of Algeria. They equally play a practical 
role in reconciliation, in a context where the state struggles to do so. The 2005 
Reconciliation Charter ruled out many possibilities for truth as part of the reconciliation 
process in Algeria, and rendered it an offence to criticise the role of the army during the 
conflict. This opting for compensation rather than truth, is heavily challenged by many 
Algerian associations.78  
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One such social association set up in the 1990s is the Boucebci Foundation in 
Algiers. The foundation commemorates the life and work of internationally renowned 
psychiatrist, Professor Mahfoud Boucebci, assassinated by Islamist insurgents in 1993. 
During his life time, Boucebci fought for the rights of those excluded from Algerian 
society: single mothers, drug addicts, abandoned children and detainees. As a founding 
member of the Algerian League of Human Rights in 1985, he fought for the respect of 
basic rights for all in society and for a secular democracy for Algeria. He was highly 
critical of the intolerant direction of Algerian society with the rise of Islamism and the 
rejection of vulnerable groups, but was also critical of the repressive nature of the 
Algerian regime. He was instrumental in the creation of a number of associations, 
working for family planning, caring for disabled children and those supporting adoptive 
families.  His assassination was thus a direct attack on Algerian civil society, 
progressive thinking and freedom of association.  
The foundation is still active today, seeking to continue his work. It has one 
permanent, paid member of staff, social development agency staff on secondment, and 
twelve psychologists who regularly volunteer. Its aim is to be a multidisciplinary social 
project, whose primary purpose is to support children who have been victims of 
violence.79 The organization houses the library of Professor Boucecbci and also 
provides practical training for its psychologists, who support over a thousand children 
annually. In partnership with the local authorities, with a small grant, the organization 
has launched a research initiative, to tackle violence in schools. Through this project 
they work with local authorities to improve teacher training and to contribute to the 
policy debate about how to reduce violence in the education system. They also provide 
support services, with their own staff being made available for the teachers from the 
selected schools.80  The association has hundreds of members, in Algeria and abroad, 
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and is funded through membership fees, local donor funding and private sector 
donations.  
Interviews with the voluntary and paid staff indicate the importance to them of 
the practical role of the association, for its legitimacy and success. Young staff 
members, working as psychologists with child victims of violence, highlight this role 
and their feelings about their work: “I feel free working in an association (…) here 
people give us their trust.”81 On personal reasons for working in such an organization, 
another staff member also pointed out how it assisted her own research into family 
therapy, but also gave meaning to her work. 82  
The Boucebci Foundation, like many associations, provides a new sphere for 
people to defend their values, and to contribute to social projects, indirectly or directly 
targeting the trauma Algerians have suffered. Volunteers work with the local structures 
of Algerian society - town halls, education and health authorities - and appear to be 
trusted by the population, unlike the political parties discussed above. Internally, like 
Bel Horizon, the foundation organizes its annual general meeting, elects its leaders and 
provides a transparent system of governance and reporting about its funding.  
Members of the association are critical of the urban policies and education 
system, particularly in the area of the capital city where they work, which saw 
thousands of families rehoused in high rise flats during the insecurity of the 1990s. To 
deal with this, the foundation engages with the local authorities to improve approaches 
to tackling violence and conflict in classrooms and homes.83 Similar socially oriented 
organisations, supporting vulnerable families across Algeria, in particular those 
campaigning for those with disabilities, are also particularly vocal in their criticism of 
the state. Organizations such as the Fédération algérienne des personnes handicapées 
have become necessary consultees for all political reforms in the social sectors, but also 
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for legislation concerning associations.84 Social associations have thus become part of 
the policy making process, and, whatever its limitations, associations have an input.   
Such organizations create autonomous spaces in which people can act, 
exchange, contest and propose critical reflection and analysis. In the case of the 
Boucebci Foundation, such discussions also cover an area in which the state has 
attempted to rule out open debate, through the restrictions of the Reconciliation Charter. 
Through their practical work with victims of violence, many associations such as this 
foundation are now able to challenge certain discourses of the authorities. They 
represent the population and provide forums for discussion,85 channelling information, 
and contributing to political debate about social policy, welfare and reconciliation, in a 
challenging political context.  
 
Conclusion 
Democratization theorists have argued that associational life can promote 
democratic socialization and increase freedom in the political sphere, through local 
empowerment and popular participation in functioning organizations. Such claims have 
been refuted, however, in authoritarian contexts which are not conducive to the 
development and free functioning of an autonomous civil society. In such contexts, 
scholars argue, associations are often pushed towards non-democratic practices and are 
more likely to ensure the durability of authoritarian regimes, rather than lead to a more 
open society.  
This article has challenged this assumption by exploring the work of a number 
of associations in contemporary Algeria, examining their democratic functioning, their 
capacity to represent citizens, and their ambitions to instigate political change. It has 
analysed associative movements such as the CNCD which brought together Islamists 
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and secular organisations under the same banner, demanding political reform during the 
Arab uprisings of 2011. This movement resulted in the lifting of the state of emergency, 
the launching of a new consultation process and the revising of the law on associations, 
hotly contested in civil society networks and in parliament. Seemingly apolitical 
associations, such as the thousands of heritage and social sector associations which exist 
across Algeria have also been discussed.  
Heritage associations such as Bel Horizon have increasingly questioned state 
narratives of the past, challenging the very idea of the Algerian nation as purely Arab-
Muslim, pushing for a more inclusive national identity and the protection of a much 
wider range of cultural heritage. Similarly, social sector organizations including the 
Boucebci Foundation, in dealing with trauma, have sought to contribute to national 
reconciliation and policy reform, in the education sector, but also in an area in which the 
state has attempted to rule out any debate, that of the 1990s conflict.  
All the associations and networks discussed function through democratic 
systems of internal governance and are inclusive and tolerant. As such, this article 
confirms Butcher’s analysis of Algerian civil society, that since the 1990 legal reforms, 
meaningful organizations have been able to develop on the ground. Associations in 
Algeria do challenge the government and are sometimes successful, for example in the 
lifting of the Emergency Laws or in the introduction of a 30 percent quota of women 
deputies in the national parliament. However, it is also argued that local associations do 
not necessarily need to directly oppose the government, to contribute to political reform. 
Grass roots associations reclaim the public sphere, as seen in the networks initiated in 
2011, and also in their daily activities. At local level, the cases have shown how 
associative actors interact with elected officials, challenge policy decisions, gain 
experience of governance and even go on to elected roles in Town Councils.86  
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Algerian associations have managed to build bridges in the post conflict period. 
The huge number of associations created since 1990 is still surprising, given the 
difficulties faced, simply in meeting.87 They have been involved in rebuilding trust 
within communities, and in state structures. In regions where associations flourish, such 
as Oran, there has been greater public debate and interaction, on questions of local 
governance.88  Autonomous spaces exist, despite fears of state interference, and there is 
recognition of the role associations play. This is not only in terms of dealing with 
trauma, but also in the opportunities they provide in a context of high unemployment 
and, as Volpi identified a decade earlier, the continued absence of “a meaningful 
political debate.”89  Through these cases, the article has explored how associations 
interact with state structures and the population. Whilst associations may not be 
transformative agents in Algerian political life, they do form an opposition, questioning 
policies and creating new ways to mobilize. They also promote reconciliation, arguably 
a necessary precondition for any further meaningful political reform.  
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